high probability. That is, with random assignment, the distributions of both observed and unobserved variables in both groups are equal in expectation. Treatment assignment is independent of Y 0 and Y 1 -i.e., {Y i0 , Y i1 ⊥ ⊥ T i }, where ⊥ ⊥ denotes independence (Dawid 1979) . Hence, for j = 0, 1
Therefore, the average treatment effect (ATE) can be estimated by:
Equation 2 can be estimated consistently in an experimental setting because randomization can ensure that observations in treatment and control groups are exchangeable. Randomization ensures that assignment to treatment will not, in expectation, be associated with the potential outcomes.
Even in an experimental setup, much can go wrong which requires statistical adjustment (e.g., Barnard, Frangakis, Hill, and Rubin 2003) . One of the most common problems which arises is the issue of compliance. People who are assigned to treatment may refuse it, and those assigned to control may find some way to receive treatment. When there are compliance issues, Equation 2 then defines the intention-to-treat (ITT) estimand. Although the concept of ITT dates earlier, the phrase probably first appeared in print in Hill (1961, 259) . Moving beyond the ITT to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated can be difficult. If the compliance problem is simply that some people assigned to treatment refused it, statistical correction is straightforward and relatively model free. When the compliance problem has a more complicated structure, it is difficult to make progress without making structural assumptions. Statistical corrections for compliance are discussed in detail in Chapter 15 of this volume (Green and Gerber 2008) .
disturbance will be strongly correlated. Randomization does not imply, as OLS assumes, a linear additive treatment effect where the coefficients are constant across units. Researchers should be extremely cautious about using multiple regression to adjust experimental data.
Unfortunately, there is a tendency to do just that. One supposes that this is yet another sign, as if one more were needed, of how ingrained the regression model is in our quantitative practice.
The only thing stochastic in the Neyman setup is the assignment to treatment. The potential outcomes are fixed. This is exactly the opposite of many econometric treatments where all of the regressors (including the treatment indicator) are considered to be fixed, and the response variable Y is considered to be a random variable with a given distribution.
None of that is implied by randomization and indeed randomization explicitly contradicts it because one of the regressors (the treatment indicator) is explicitly random. Adding to the confusion is the tendency of some texts to refer to the fixed regressors design as an experiment when that cannot possibly be the case.
Observational Data
In an observational setting, unless something special is done, treatment and non-treatment groups are almost never balanced because the two groups are not ordinarily drawn from the same population. Thus, a common quantity of interest is the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT):
Equation 3 cannot be directly estimated because Y i0 is not observed for the treated. Progress can be made by assuming that selection for treatment depends on observable covariates X.
Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) , one can assume that conditional on X, treatment assignment is unconfounded ({Y 0 , Y 1 ⊥ ⊥ T } | X) and that there is overlap: 0 < P r(T = 1 | X) < 1.
Together, unconfoundedness and overlap constitute a property known as strong ignorability of assignment which is necessary for identifying the treatment effect. Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) shows that for ATT, the unconfoundedness assumption can be weakened to mean independence:
Then, following Rubin (1974 Rubin ( , 1977 we obtain
By conditioning on observed covariates, X i , treatment and control groups are balanced. The average treatment effect for the treated is estimated as
where the outer expectation is taken over the distribution of X i | (T i = 1) which is the distribution of baseline variables in the treated group.
Note that the ATT estimator is changing how individual observations are weighted, and that observations which are outside of common support receive zero weights. That is, if some covariate values are only observed for control observations, those observations will be irrelevant for estimating ATT and are effectively dropped. Therefore, the overlap assumption for ATT only requires that the support of X for the treated observations be a subset of the support of X for control observations. More generally, one would also want to drop treatment observations if they have covariate values which do not overlap with control observations (Crump, Hotz, Imbens, and Mitnik 2006) . In such cases, it is unclear exactly the estimand one is estimating because it is no longer ATT as some treatment observations have been dropped along with some control observations.
It is often jarring for people to observe that observations are being dropped because of a lack of covariate overlap. But dropping observations which are outside of common support not only reduces bias but can also reduce the variance of our estimates. This may be counter intuitive, but note that our variance estimates are a function of both sample size and unit heterogeneity-e.g., in the regression case, of the sample variance of X and the the mean square error. Dropping observations outside of common support and conditioning as in Equation 5 helps to improve unit homogeneity and may actually reduce our variance estimates (Rosenbaum 2005) . Moreover, as Rosenbaum (2005) shows, with observational data, minimizing unit heterogeneity reduces both sampling variability and sensitivity to unobserved bias. With less unit heterogeneity, larger unobserved biases need to exist to explain away a given effect. And although increasing the sample size reduces sampling variability, it does little to reduce concerns about unobserved bias. Thus, maximizing unit homogeneity to the extent possible is an important task for observational methods.
The key assumption being made here is strong ignorability. Even thinking about this assumption presupposes some rigor in the research design. The most useful of which may be the one suggested by Dorn (1953, 680) For the moment let us assume that the researcher has a clear treatment of interest, and a set of confounders which may reasonably ensure conditional independence of treatment assignment. At that point, one needs to condition on these confounders denoted by X. But we must remember that selection on observables is a large concession, which should not be made lightly. It is of far greater relevance than the technical discussion which follows on the best way to condition on covariates.
Matching Methods
There is no consensus on how exactly matching ought to be done, how to measure the success of the matching procedure, and whether or not matching estimators are sufficiently robust to misspecification so as to be useful in practice (Heckman et al. 1998) . The most straightforward and nonparametric way to condition on X is to exactly match on the covariates. This is an old approach going back to at least Fechner (1966 Fechner ( [1860 ), the father of psychophysics. This approach fails in finite samples if the dimensionality of X is large and is simply impossible if X contains continuous covariates. Thus, in general, alternative methods must be used.
Two common approaches are propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) and multivariate matching based on Mahalanobis distance (Cochran and Rubin 1973; Rubin 1979 Rubin , 1980 . Matching methods based on the propensity score (estimated by logistic regression), Mahalanobis distance or a combination of the two have appealing theoretical properties if covariates have ellipsoidal distributions-e.g., distributions such as the normal or t. If the covariates are so distributed, these methods (more generally affinely invariant matching methods 4 ) have the property of "equal percent bias reduction" (EPBR) (Rubin 1976a,b; Rubin and Thomas 1992) . 5 This property, which is formally defined in Appendix A, ensures that matching methods will reduce bias in all linear combinations of the covariates.
If a matching method is not EPBR, then that method will, in general, increase the bias for some linear function of the covariates even if all univariate means are closer in the matched data than the unmatched (Rubin 1976a ).
Mahalanobis and Propensity Score Matching
The most common method of multivariate matching is based on Mahalanobis distance (Cochran and Rubin 1973; Rubin 1979 Rubin , 1980 . The Mahalanobis distance between any two column vectors is:
where S is the sample covariance matrix of X. To estimate ATT, one matches each treated unit with the M closest control units, as defined by this distance measure, md().
6 If X consists of more than one continuous variable, multivariate matching estimates contain a bias term which does not asymptotically go to zero at √ n (Abadie and Imbens 2006 ).
An alternative way to condition on X is to match on the probability of assignment to treatment, known as the propensity score. 7 As one's sample size grows large, matching on the propensity score produces balance on the vector of covariates X (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) .
, defining e(X i ) to be the propensity score.
is important, but it is restricted to a limited set of mixtures. See Appendix A. 6 One can do matching with replacement or without. Alternatively one can do optimal full matching (Hansen 2004; Rosenbaum 1991) instead of the greedy matching. But this decision is a separate one from the choice of a distance metric.
7 The first estimator of treatment effects to be based on a weighted function of the probability of treatment was the Horvitz-Thompson statistic (Horvitz and Thompson 1952). e(X i ))
(1−T i ) , then as Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) prove,
where the outer expectation is taken over the distribution of e(X i ) | (T i = 1). Since the propensity score is generally unknown, it must be estimated.
Propensity score matching involves matching each treated unit to the nearest control unit on the unidimensional metric of the propensity score vector. If the propensity score is estimated by logistic regression, as is typically the case, much is to be gained by matching not on the predicted probabilities (bounded between zero and one) but on the linear predictor:
Matching on the linear predictor avoids compression of propensity scores near zero and one. Moreover, the linear predictor is often more nearly normally distributed which is of some importance given the EPBR results if the propensity score is matched along with other covariates.
Mahalanobis distance and propensity score matching can be combined in various ways (Rubin 2001; Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985) . It is useful to combine the propensity score with
Mahalanobis distance matching because propensity score matching is particularly good at minimizing the discrepancy along the propensity score and Mahalanobis distance is particularly good at minimizing the distance between individual coordinates of X (orthogonal to the propensity score) (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985) .
A significant shortcoming of common matching methods, such as Mahalanobis distance and propensity score matching, is that they may (and in practice, frequently do) make balance worse across measured potential confounders. These methods may make balance worse, in practice, even if covariates are distributed ellipsoidally symmetric, because EPBR is a property that obtains in expectation. That is, even if the covariates have elliptic distributions, finite samples may not conform to ellipticity, and hence Mahalanobis distance may not be optimal because the matrix used to scale the distances, the covariance matrix of X, can be improved upon. in X 1 will be more important than X 2 .
Given these limitations, it may be desirable to use a matching method which algorithmically imposes certain properties when the EPBR property does not hold. Genetic Matching does just that.
Genetic Matching
Sekhon (2007) and Diamond and Sekhon (2005) propose a matching algorithm, Genetic
Matching, which maximizes the balance of observed covariates between treated and control groups. Genetic Matching is a generalization of propensity score and Mahalanobis distance matching, and it has been used by a variety of researchers (e.g., Bonney and Minozzi 2007; Brady and Hui 2006; Gilligan and Sergenti 2006; Gordon and Huber 2007; Wand forthcoming; Morgan and Harding 2006; Lenz and Ladd 2006; Park 2006; Raessler and Rubin 2005) . The algorithm uses a genetic algorithm Sekhon and Mebane 1998) to optimize balance as much as possible given the data. The method is nonparametric and does not depend on knowing or estimating the propensity score, but the method is improved when a propensity score is incorporated. Diamond and Sekhon (2005) use this algorithm to show that the long running debate between Dehejia and Wahba (2002; 1999; Dehejia 2005) and Smith and Todd (2005b,a, 2001 ) is largely a result of researchers using models which do not produce good balance-even if some of the models get close by chance to the experimental benchmark of interest. They show that Genetic Matching is able to quickly find good balance and reliably recover the experimental benchmark.
The idea underlying the Genetic Matching algorithm is that if Mahalanobis distance is not optimal for achieving balance in a given dataset, one should be able to search over the space of distance metrics and find something better. One way of generalizing the Mahalanobis metric is to include an additional weight matrix:
where W is a k × k positive definite weight matrix and S 1/2 is the Cholesky decomposition of S which is the variance-covariance matrix of X.
9
Note that if one has a good propensity score model, one should include it as one of the covariates in Genetic Matching. If this is done, both propensity score matching and Mahalanobis matching can be considered special limiting cases of Genetic Matching. If the propensity score contains all of the relevant information in a given sample, the other variables will be given zero weight. 10 And Genetic Matching will converge to Mahalanobis distance if that proves to be the appropriate distance measure.
Genetic Matching is an affinely invariant matching algorithm that uses the distance measure d(), in which all elements of W are zero except down the main diagonal. The main diagonal consists of k parameters which must be chosen. Note that if each of these k parameters are set equal to 1, d() is the same as Mahalanobis distance.
The choice of setting the non-diagonal elements of W to zero is made for reasons of computational power alone. The optimization problem grows exponentially with the number 9 The Cholesky decomposition is parameterized such that S = LL , S 1/2 = L. In other words, L is a lower triangular matrix with positive diagonal elements.
10 Technically, the other variables will be given weights just large enough to ensure that the weight matrix is positive definite.
of free parameters. It is important that the problem be parameterized so as to limit the number of parameters which must be estimated.
This leaves the problem of how to choose the free elements of W . Many loss criteria recommend themselves, and many can be used with the software which implements Genetic Matching.
11 By default, cumulative probability distribution functions of a variety of standardized statistics are used as balance metrics and are optimized without limit. The default standardized statistics are paired t-tests and bootstrapped nonparametric KolmogorovSmirnov tests (Abadie 2002 ).
The statistics are not used to conduct formal hypothesis tests, because no measure of balance is a monotonic function of bias in the estimand of interest and because we wish to maximize balance without limit. Alternatively, one may choose to minimize some descriptive measure of imbalance such as the maximum gap in the standardized empirical-QQ plots across the covariates. This would correspond to minimizing the D statistic of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
Conceptually, the algorithm attempts to minimize the largest observed covariate discrepancy at every step. This is accomplished by maximizing the smallest p-value at each step.
The default Genetic Matching loss function does allow for imbalance in functions of X to worsen as long as the maximum discrepancy is reduced. This default behavior can be altered by the analyst. It is important that the maximum discrepancy be small-i.e., that the smallest p-value be large. The p-values conventionally understood to signal balance (e.g., 0.10), may be too low to produce reliable estimates. After Genetic Matching optimization, the p-values from these balance tests cannot be interpreted as true probabilities because of standard pre-test problems, but they remain useful measures of balance. Also, we are interested in maximizing the balance in the current sample so a hypothesis test for balance is inappropriate.
The optimization problem described above is difficult and irregular, and the genetic algorithm implemented in the R rgenoud package ) is used to conduct the optimization. Details of the algorithm are provided in Sekhon and Mebane (1998) .
Genetic Matching is shown to have better properties than the usual alternative matching methods both when the EPBR property holds and when it does not (Sekhon 2007; Diamond and Sekhon 2005) . Even when the EPBR property holds and the mapping from X to Y is linear, Genetic Matching has better efficiency-i.e., lower mean square error (MSE)-in finite samples. When the EPBR property does not hold as it generally does not, Genetic
Matching retains appealing properties and the differences in performance between Genetic
Matching and the other matching methods can become substantial both in terms of bias and MSE reduction. In short, at the expense of computer time, Genetic Matching dominates the other matching methods in terms of MSE when assumptions required for EPBR hold and, even more so, when they do not.
Genetic Matching is able to retain good properties even when EPBR does not hold because a set of constraints is imposed by the loss function optimized by the genetic algorithm. The loss function depends on a large number of functions of covariate imbalance across matched treatment and control groups. Given these measures, Genetic Matching will optimize covariate balance.
Matching designs have long been used by social scientists conducting qualitative research methods. But case study matching methods often rely on the assumption that the relationships between the variables of interest are deterministic. This is unfortunate because failure to heed the lessons of statistical inference often leads to serious inferential errors, some of which are easy to avoid. The canonical example of deterministic matching designs methods is the set of rules (canons) of inductive inference formalized by John Stuart Mill in his A System of Logic (1872).
The "most similar" and the "most different" research designs, which are often used in comparative politics, are variants of Mill's methods (Przeworski and Teune 1970) . As such,
Mill's methods have been used by generations of social science researchers (Cohen and Nagel 1934 ), but they contrast sharply with statistical methods. These methods do not lead to valid inductive inferences unless a number of very special assumptions hold. Some researchers seem to be either unaware or unconvinced of these methodological difficulties even though the acknowledged originator of the methods, Mill himself, clearly described many of their limitations.
These canonical qualitative methods of causal inference are only valid when the hypothesized relationship between the cause and effect of interest is unique and deterministic.
These two conditions imply other conditions such as the absence of measurement error which would cease to make the hypothesized causal relationship deterministic as least as we observe it. These assumptions are strict, and they strongly restrict the applicability of the methods. When these methods of inductive inference are not applicable, conditional probabilities should be used to compare the relevant counterfactuals.
13
13 Needless-to-say, although Mill was familiar with the work of Laplace and other 19th century statisticians, by today's standards his understanding of estimation and hypothesis testing was simplistic and often For these methods to lead to valid inferences there must be only one possible cause of the effect of interest, the relationship between cause and effect must be deterministic, and there must be no measurement error. If these assumptions are to be relaxed, random factors must be accounted for. Because of these random factors, statistical and probabilistic methods of inference are necessary.
To appreciate how serious these limitations are, consider the case of benchmarking statistical software on modern computer systems-for details see Sekhon (2006) . Such computers are Turing machines hence they are deterministic systems where everything a computer does is in theory observable. To put it another way, your random number generator is not really random. Your pseudorandom numbers are the result of a deterministic algorithm. But notwithstanding the deterministic nature of a computer, methods like those proposed by qualitative researchers for making inferences with deterministic systems are not used in the benchmarking literature. When benchmarking, it is common to match on (and hence eliminate) as many confounders as possible and to report measures of uncertainty and statistical hypothesis tests. Since computers are deterministic, the remaining uncertainty must come from confounders-as opposed to sampling error-which could in theory be observed and hence eliminated. But the system is considered to be so complex that most benchmarking exercises resort to statistical measures of association. Thus, even in this setting where we know we are dealing with a deterministic system, benchmarking exercises rely on statistical measures because of the complexity involved. Certainly society is more complex than a computer and our social measurements are more prone to error than those of computers.
Mill's Methods and Conditional Probabilities
Since the application of the five methods Mill discusses has a long history in the social sciences, I am hardly the first to criticize the use of these methods in all but very special erroneous. He did, however, understand that if one wants to make valid empirical inferences, one needs to obtain and compare conditional probabilities when there may be more than one possible cause of an effect or when the causal relationship is complicated by interaction effects.
circumstances. For example, Robinson, who is well known in political science for his work on the ecological inference problem, 14 also criticized the use of Mill-type methods of analytic induction in the social sciences (Robinson 1951 15 For details on the relationship between qualitative comparative analysis and standard regression see Seawright (2004) .
16 For all page referencing I have used a reprint of the eighth edition of A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive, first published in 1872. The eighth edition was the last printed in Mill's lifetime. The eighth and third editions were especially revised and supplemented with new material. a mistake because it obscures the tremendous difference between the combined method or what Mill calls the Indirect Method of Difference and the Direct Method of Difference (Mill 1872, 259) . Both the Method of Agreement and the Indirect Method of Difference, which is actually the Method of Agreement applied twice, are limited and require the machinery of probability in order to take chance into account when considering cases where the number of causes may be greater than one or where there may be interactions between the causes (Mill 1872, 344 ). Other factors not well explored by Mill, such as measurement error, lead to the same conclusion (Lieberson 1991) . The Direct Method of Difference is almost entirely limited to the experimental setting. And even in the case of the Direct Method of Difference, chance must be taken into account in the presence of measurement error or if there are interactions between causes which lead to probabilistic relationships between a cause, A, and its effect, a.
Next, we review Mill's first three canons and show the importance of taking chance into account and comparing conditional probabilities when chance variations cannot be ignored.
First Canon: Method of Agreement
"If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon" (Mill 1872, 255) .
Assume that the possible causes, i.e., antecedents, under consideration are denoted by A, B, C, D, E, and the effect we are interested in is denoted by a.
17 An antecedent may be comprised of more than one constituent event or condition. For example, permanganate ion with oxalic acid forms carbon dioxide (and manganous ion). Separately, neither permanganate ion nor oxalic acid will produce carbon dioxide, but if combined, they will. In this example, A may be defined as the presence of both permanganate ion and oxalic acid.
17 Following Mill's usage, my usage of the word "antecedent" is synonymous with "possible cause." Neither Mill nor I intend to imply that events must be ordered in time to be causally related.
Let us further assume that we observe two instances and in the first we observe the antecedents A, B, C, and in the second we observe the antecedents A, D, E. If we also observe the effect, a, in both cases, we would say, following Mill's Method of Agreement, that A is the cause of a. We conclude this because A was the only antecedent which occurred in both observations-i.e., the observations agree on the presence of antecedent A. This method has eliminated antecedents B, C, D, E as possible causes of a. Using this method, we endeavor to obtain observations which agree in the effect, a, and the supposed cause, A, but differ in the presence of other antecedents.
Second Canon: Method of Difference
"If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon" (Mill 1872, 256 ).
In the Method of Difference we require, contrary to the Method of Agreement, observations resembling one another in every other respect, but differing in the presence or absence of the antecedent we conjecture to be the true cause of a. If our object is to discover the effects of an antecedent A, we must introduce A into some set of circumstances we consider relevant, such as B, C, and having noted the effects produced, compare them with the effects of the remaining circumstances B, C, when A is absent. If the effect of A, B, C is a, b, c, and the effect of B, C is b, c, it is evident, under this argument, that the cause of a is A.
Both of these methods are based on a process of elimination. This process has been understood since Francis Bacon to be a centerpiece of inductive reasoning (Pledge 1939 ).
The Method of Agreement is supported by the argument that whatever can be eliminated is not connected with the phenomenon of interest, a. The Method of Difference is supported by the argument that whatever cannot be eliminated is connected with the phenomenon by a law. Because both methods are based on the process of elimination, they are deterministic in nature. For if even one case is observed where effect a occurs without the presence of antecedent A, we would eliminate antecedent A from causal consideration.
Mill asserts that the Method of Difference is commonly used in experimental science while the Method of Agreement, which is substantially weaker, is employed when experimentation is impossible (Mill 1872, 256) . The Method of Difference is Mill's attempt to describe the inductive logic of experimental design. And the method takes into account two of the key features of experimental design, the first being the presence of a manipulation (treatment) and the second a comparison between two states of the world which are in Mill's case exactly alike aside from the presence of the antecedent of interest.
18 The method also incorporates the notion of a relative causal effect. The effect of antecedent A is measured relative to the effect observed in the most similar world without A. The two states of the world we are considering only differ in the presence or absence of A.
The Method of Difference only accurately describes a small subset of experiments. The method is too restrictive even if the relationship between the antecedent A and effect a were to be deterministic. Today we would say that the control group B, C and the group with the intervention A, B, C need not be exactly alike (aside from the presence or absence of A).
It would be fantastic if the two groups were exactly alike, but such a situation is not only extremely difficult to find but also not necessary. Some laboratory experiments are based on this strong assumption, but a more common assumption, and one which brings in statistical concerns, is that observations in both groups are balanced before our intervention. That is, before we apply the treatment, the distributions of both observed and unobserved variables in both groups are equal. For example, if group A is the southern states in the United States and group B is the northern states, the two groups are not balanced. The distribution of a 18 The requirement of a manipulation by the researcher has troubled many philosophers of science. But the claim is not that causality requires a human manipulation, but only that if we wish to measure the effect of a given antecedent we gain much if we are able to manipulate the antecedent. For example, manipulation of the antecedent of interest allows us to be confident that the antecedent caused the effect and not the other way around-see Brady (2008) . long list of variables is different between the two groups.
Random assignment of treatment ensures, if the sample size is large and if other assumptions are met, that the control and treatment groups are balanced even on unobserved variables.
19 Random assignment ensures that the treatment is uncorrelated with all baseline variables 20 whether we can observe them or not.
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Because of its reliance on random assignment, modern concepts of experimental design sharply diverge from Mill's deterministic model. The two groups are not exactly alike in baseline characteristics (as they would have to be in a deterministic setup), but, instead, their baseline characteristics have the same distribution. And consequently the baseline variables are uncorrelated with whether a particular unit received treatment or not.
When the balance assumption is satisfied, a modern experimenter estimates the relative causal effect by comparing the conditional probability of some outcome given the treatment minus the conditional probability of the outcome given that the treatment was not received.
In the canonical experimental setting, conditional probabilities can be directly interpreted as causal effects.
In the penultimate section of this chapter, I discuss the complications which arise in using conditional probabilities to make causal inferences when randomization of treatment is not possible. With observational data (i.e., data found in nature and not a product of experimental manipulation), many complications arise which prevent conditional probabilities from being directly interpreted as estimates of causal effects. Problems also often arise with experiments which prevent the simple conditional probabilities from being interpreted as relative causal effects. School voucher experiments are a good example. 22 But the prob-
19
Aside from a large sample size, experiments need to also meet a number of other conditions. See Campbell and Stanley (1966) for an overview particularly relevant for the social sciences. An important problem with experiments dealing with human beings is the issue of compliance. Full compliance implies that every person assigned to treatment actually receives the treatment and every person assigned to control does not. Fortunately, if noncompliance is an issue, there are a number of possible corrections which make few and reasonable assumptions-see Barnard et al. (2003) .
20 Baseline variables are the variables observed before treatment is applied. 21 More formally, random assignment results in the treatment being stochastically independent of all baseline variables as long as the sample size is large and other assumptions are satisfied.
22 Barnard et al. (2003) discuss in detail a broken school voucher experiment and a correction using strat-lems are more serious with observational data where neither a manipulation nor balance are present.
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One of the continuing appeals of deterministic methods for case study researchers is the power of the methods. For example, Mill's Method of Difference can determine causality with only two observations. This power can only be obtained by assuming that the observation with the antecedent of interest, A, B, C and the one without, B, C are exactly alike accept for the manipulation of A, and by assuming deterministic causation and the absence of measurement error and interactions among antecedents. This power makes deterministic methods alluring for case study researchers, who generally don't have many observations.
Once probabilistic factors are introduced, larger numbers of observations are required to make useful inferences. Because of the power of deterministic methods, social scientists with a small number of observations are tempted to rely on Mill's methods. Because these researchers cannot conduct experiments, they largely rely on the Method of Agreement, which we have discussed, and Mill's third canon.
Third Canon: Indirect Method of Difference
"If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance, the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon" (Mill 1872, 259 ).
This method arises by a "double employment of the Method of Agreement" (Mill 1872, 258 ). If we observe a set of observations in all of which we observe a and note that they have no antecedent in common but A, by the Method of Agreement we have evidence that A is ification. 23 In an experiment much can go wrong (e.g., compliance and missing data problems), but the fact that there was a manipulation can be very helpful in correcting the problems- Barnard et al. (2003) . Corrections are more problematic in the absence of an experimental manipulation because additional assumptions are required.
the cause of the effect a. Ideally, we would then perform an experiment where we manipulate A to see if the effect a is present when the antecedent A is absent. When we cannot conduct such an experiment, we can instead use the Method of Agreement again. Suppose, we can find another set of observations in which neither the antecedent A nor the effect a occur.
We may now conclude, by use of the Indirect Method of Difference, that A is the cause of a.
Thus, by twice using the Method of Agreement we may hope to establish both the positive and negative instance which the Method of Difference requires. However, this double use of the Method of Agreement is clearly inferior. The Indirect Method of Difference cannot fulfill the requirements of the Direct Method of Difference. For, "the requisitions of the Method of Difference are not satisfied unless we can be quite sure either that the instances affirmative of a agree in no antecedents whatever but A, or that the instances negative of a agree in nothing but the negation of A" (Mill 1872, 259) . In other words, the Direct Method of Difference is the superior method because it entails a strong manipulation: we manipulate the antecedents so that we can remove the suspected cause, A, and then put it back at will, without disturbing the balance of what may lead to a. And this manipulation ensures that the only difference in the antecedents between the two observations is the presence of A or its lack.
Researchers are often unclear about these distinctions between the indirect and direct methods of difference. They often simply state they are using the Method of Difference when they are actually only using the Indirect Method of Difference. For example, Skocpol states that she is using both the Method of Agreement and the "more powerful" Method of Difference when she is only using at best the weaker Method of Agreement twice (Skocpol 1979, 36-37) . It is understandable that Skocpol is not able to use the Direct Method of Difference since it would be impossible to manipulate the factors of interest. But it is important to be clear about exactly which method one is using.
Mill discusses two other canons: the Method of Residues (Fourth Canon) and the Method of Concomitant Variations (Fifth Canon). We do not review these canons because they are not directly relevant to our discussion.
We have so far outlined the three methods of Mill with which we are concerned. We have also shown that when scholars such as Skocpol assert that they are using the Method of Agreement and the Method of Difference (Skocpol 1979, 37) , they are actually using the Indirect Method of Difference, and that this is indeed the weaker sibling of the Direct Method of Difference. This weakness would not be of much concern if the phenomena we studied were simple. However, in the social sciences we encounter serious causal complexities.
Mill's methods of inductive inference are valid only if the mapping between antecedents and effects is unique and deterministic (Mill 1872, 285-299, 344-350) . These conditions allow neither for more than one cause for an effect nor for interactions between causes. In other words, if we are interested in effect a, we must assume a priori that only one possible cause exists for a and that when a's cause is present, say cause A, the effect, a, must always occur. In fact, these two conditions, of uniqueness and determinism, define the set of antecedents we are considering. This implies, for example, that the elements in the set of causes A, B, C, D, E must be able to occur independently of each other. The condition is not that antecedents must be independent in the probabilistic sense of the word, but that any one of the antecedents can occur without necessitating the presence or lack thereof of any of the other antecedents. Otherwise, the possible effects of antecedents are impossible to distinguish by these rules.
24 Generalizations of Mill's methods also suffer from these limitations (Little 1998, 221-223) .
The foregoing has a number of implications the most important of which is that for deterministic methods such as Mill's to work there must be no measurement error. For even if there were a deterministic relationship between antecedent A and effect a, if we were able to measure either A or a only with some stochastic error, the resulting observed relationship 24 Mill's methods have additional limitations which are outside the scope of this discussion. For example, there is a set of conditions, call it Z, which always exists but is unconnected with the phenomenon of interest. For example, the star Sirius is always present (but not always observable) whenever it rains in Boston. Is the star Sirius and its gravitational force causally related to rain in Boston? Significant issues arise from this question which I do not discuss.
would be probabilistic. It would be probabilistic because it would be possible to observe a case in which we mistakenly think we have observed antecedent A (because of measurement error) while not observing a. In such a situation the process of elimination would lead us to conclude that A is not a cause of a.
To my knowledge no modern social scientist argues that the conditions of uniqueness and lack of measurement error hold in the social sciences. However, the question of whether deterministic causation is plausible has a sizable literature.
25 Most of this discussion centers on whether deterministic relationships are possible-i.e., on the ontological status of deterministic causation. 26 Although such discussions can be fruitful, we need not decide the ontological issues in order to make empirical progress. This is fortunate because the ontological issues are at best difficult to resolve and may be impossible to resolve. Even if one concedes that deterministic social associations exist, it is unclear how we would ever learn about them if there are multiple causes with complex interactions or if our measures are noisy. The case of multiple causes and complex interactions among deterministic associations would, to us, look probabilistic in the absence of a theory (and measurements) which accurately accounted for the complicated causal mechanisms-e.g., Little (1998, ch. 11 ). There appears to be some agreement among qualitative and quantitative researchers that there is "complexity-induced probabilism" (Bennett 1998 ). Thus, I think it is more fruitful to focus instead on the practical issue of how we learn about causes-i.e., on the epistemological issues related to causality.
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Focusing on epistemological issues also helps to avoid some thorny philosophical questions regarding the ontological status of probabilistic notions of causality. For example, if one can accurately estimate the probability distribution of A causing a, does that mean that we can explain any particular occurrence of a? Wesley Salmon, after surveying three prominent theories of probabilistic causality in the mid-1980s, noted that "the primary moral I drew was that causal concepts cannot be fully explicated in terms of statistical relationships; in addition, I concluded, we need to appeal to causal processes and causal interactions" (Salmon 1989, 168) . I do not think these metaphysical issues ought to concern practicing scientists. Deduction plays a prominent role in this approach.
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The second response relies on conditional probabilities and counterfactuals. These responses are not mutually exclusive. Economics, for example, is a field which relies heavily on both formal theories and statistical empirical tests. Indeed, unless the proposed formal theories are nearly complete, there will always be a need to take random factors into account. And even the most ambitious formal modeler will no doubt concede that a complete deductive theory of politics is probably impossible. Given that our theories are weak, our causes complex and data noisy, we cannot avoid conditional probabilities. Even researchers sympathetic to finding necessary or sufficient causes are often led to probability given these problems (e.g., Ragin 2000) .
possible to have a causal theory that makes no reference to counterfactuals (Brady 2008; Dawid 2000) , but counterfactual theories of causality are by far the norm, especially in statistics. to determine what effect this treatment had on Jane's behavior (i.e, whether she voted or not), we still have to obtain some estimate of the counterfactual in which we did not contact Jane. We could, for example, seek to compare Jane's behavior with someone exactly like Jane whom we did not contact. The reality, however, is that there is no one exactly like Jane with whom we can compare Jane's turnout decision. Instead, in a randomized experiment we obtain a group of people (the larger the better) and we assign treatment to a randomly chosen subset (to contact) and we assign the remainder to the control group (not to be contacted). We then observe the difference in turnout rates between the two groups and we attribute any differences to our treatment.
In principle the process of random assignment results in the observed and unobserved baselines variables of the two groups being balanced. 29 In the simplest setup, individuals in both groups are supposed to be equally likely to receive the treatment, and hence assignment to treatment will not be associated with anything which may also affect one's propensity to vote. In an observational setting, unless something special is done, the treatment and non-treatment groups are almost never balanced.
The core counterfactual motivation is often forgotten when researchers estimate conditional probabilities to make causal inferences. This situation often arises when quantitative scholars attempt to estimate partial effects. If one were able to estimate a regression model, for example, which showed that there was no relationship between the race of a voter and her probability of casting uncounted ballots when and only when one controlled for a long list of covariates, it would be unclear 30 A partial effect is the effect a given antecedent has on the outcome variable net of all the other antecedents-i.e., when all of the other variables "are held constant."
31 See Herron and Sekhon (2003; A large number of other issues are also important when one is examining the quality of the conditional probabilities one has estimated. A prominent example is the extent to which one can combine a given collection of observations. The combining of observations which are actually rather different is one of the standard objections to statistical analysis.
But the question of when and how one can legitimately combine observations is and has long been one of the central research questions in statistics. In fact, the original purpose of least squares was to give astronomers a way of combining and weighting their discrepant observations in order to obtain better estimates of the locations and motions of celestial objects (Stigler 1986 ). Generally used methods, such as robust estimation, still require that the model for combining observations is correct for most of the sample under consideration so they do not get to the heart of the problem (e.g., Bartels 1996; Mebane and Sekhon 2004) . This is a subject that political scientists need to pay more attention to.
Discussion
This chapter has by no means offered a complete discussion of causality and all one has to do in order to demonstrate a causal relationship. There is much more to this than just conditional probabilities and even counterfactuals. For example, it is often important to find the causal mechanism at work, in the sense of understanding the sequence of events which lead from A to a. And I agree with qualitative researchers that case studies are particularly helpful in learning about such mechanisms. Process tracing is often cited as being particularly useful in this regard.
32
The importance of searching for causal mechanisms is often overestimated by political scientists and this sometimes leads to an underestimate of the importance of comparing conditional probabilities. We do not need to have much or any knowledge about mechanisms in order to know that a causal relationship exists. For example, by the use of rudimentary experiments, aspirin has been known to help with pain since Felix Hoffmann synthesized a stable form of acetylsalicylic acid in 1897. In fact, the bark and leaves of the willow tree (rich in the substance called salicin) have been known to help alleviate pain at least since the time of Hippocrates. But the causal mechanism by which aspirin alleviates pain was a mystery until recently. Only in 1971 did John Vane discover aspirin's biological mechanism of action.
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And even now, although we know how it crosses the blood-brain barrier, we have little idea 32 Process tracing is the enterprise of using narrative and other qualitative methods to determine the mechanisms by which a particular antecedent produces its effects-see George and McKeown (1985) .
33 He was awarded the 1982 Nobel Prize for Medicine for this discovery.
how the chemical changes in the brain due to aspirin get translated into the conscious feeling of pain relief-after all, the mind-body problem has not been solved. But knowledge of causal mechanisms is important and useful and no causal account can be considered complete without a mechanism being demonstrated or at the very least hypothesized.
The search for causal mechanisms is probably especially useful when working with observational data. But it is still not necessary. In the case of the causal relationship between smoking and cancer, human experiments were not possible yet most (but not all) neutral researchers were convinced of the causal relationship well before the biological mechanisms were known.
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In clinical medicine case studies continue to contribute valuable knowledge even though large-N statistical research dominates. Although the coexistence is sometimes uneasy, as noted by the rise of clinical outcomes research, it is nevertheless extremely fruitful and more cooperative than the relationship in political science. 35 One reason for this is that in clinical medicine, researchers reporting cases more readily acknowledge that the statistical framework helps to provide information about when and where cases are informative (Vandenbroucke 2001) . Cases can be highly informative when our understanding of the phenomena of interest is very poor, because then we can learn a great deal from a few observations. On the other hand, when our understanding is generally very good, a few cases which combine a set of circumstances that we believed could not exist or, more realistically, were believed to be highly unlikely can alert us to overlooked phenomena. Some observations are more important than others and there sometimes are "critical cases" (Eckstein 1975 ). This point is not new to qualitative methodologists because there is an implicit (and all too rarely 34 R. A. Fisher, one of the fathers of modern statistics and the experimental method, was a notable exception. Without the manipulation offered by an experiment, he remained skeptical. He hypothesized that genetic factors could cause people to both smoke and get cancer, and hence there need not be any causal relationship between smoking and cancer (Fisher 1958a,b) .
35 Returning to the aspirin example, it is interesting to note that Lawrence Craven, a general practitioner, noticed in 1948 that the 400 men he had prescribed aspirin to did not suffer any heart attacks. But it was not until 1985 that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved the use of aspirin for the purposes of reducing the risk of heart attack. And in 1988 the Physicians' Health Study, a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled trial of apparently healthy men, was stopped early because the effectiveness of aspirin had finally been demonstrated (Steering Committee of the Physicians' Health Study Research Group 1989).
explicit) Bayesianism in their discussion of the relative importance of cases (George and McKeown 1985; McKeown 1999) . If one only has a few observations, it is more important than otherwise to pay careful attention to the existing state of knowledge when selecting cases and when deciding how informative they are. In general, as our understanding of an issue improves, individual cases become less important.
The logical fallacy of cum hoc ergo propter hoc ("with this, therefore because of this") is committed by social scientists as a matter of course. Looking over a random sample of quantitative articles in the APSR over the past 30 years, there appears to be no decline in articles which commit this fallacy. The fallacy is now more often committed in a multivariate sense with the use of multiple regression as opposed to correlations or crosstabs. But that does not avoid the problem.
Historically, the matching literature, like much of statistics, has been limited by computational power. What is possible with matching today is nothing like what was possible in 1970 let alone during Mill's time. Not so long ago estimating a logistic regression, the common way today to estimate the propensity score, was prohibitive for all but the smallest of datasets. Today, as we have seen, we can apply machine learning algorithms to the matching problem. These technical innovations will continue, but history teaches us to be cautious about what the technical advances will bring us. Without a greater focus on experimental research and rigorous observational designs, it is unclear what substantive progress is possible.
A Equal Percent Bias Reduction (EPBR)
Affinely invariant matching methods, such as Mahalanobis metric matching and propensity score matching (if the propensity score is estimated by logistic regression), are equal percent bias reducing if all of the covariates used have ellipsoidal distributions (Rubin and Thomas 1992)-e.g., distributions such as the normal or t-or if the covariates are mixtures of proportional ellipsoidally symmetric (DMPES) distributions Rubin and Stuart (2005) .
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To formally define EPBR, let Z be the expected value of X in the matched control group.
Then, as outlined in Rubin (1976a) , a matching procedure is EPBR if E(X | T = 1) − Z = γ {E(X | T = 1) − E(X | T = 0)} for a scalar 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. In other words, we say that a matching method is EPBR for X when the percent reduction in the biases of each of the matching variables is the same. One obtains the same percent reduction in bias for any linear function of X if and only if the matching method is EPBR for X. Moreover, if a matching method is not EPBR for X, the bias for some linear function of X is increased even if all univariate covariate means are closer in the matched data than the unmatched (Rubin 1976a ).
Even if the covariates have elliptic distributions, in finite samples they may not. Then Mahalanobis distance may not be optimal because the matrix used to scale the distances, the covariance matrix of X, can be improved upon.
The EPBR property itself is limited and in a given substantive problem it may not be desirable. This can arise if it is known based on theory that one covariate has a large nonlinear relationship with the outcome while another does not-e.g., Y = X
